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Previous work showed that economic decisions can be made independently of spatial contingencies. However, when goods available for choice bear different action costs, the decision
necessarily reﬂects aspects of the action. One possibility is that “stimulus values” are
combined with the corresponding action costs in a motor representation, and decisions are
then made in actions space. Alternatively, action costs could be integrated with other
determinants of value in a non-spatial representation. If so, decisions under variable action
costs could take place in goods space. Here, we recorded from orbitofrontal cortex while
monkeys chose between different juices offered in variable amounts. We manipulated action
costs by varying the saccade amplitude, and we dissociated in time and space offer presentation from action planning. Neurons encoding the binary choice outcome did so well
before the presentation of saccade targets, indicating that decisions were made in goods
space.
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ccording to current views, economic choices involve the
computation and comparison of subjective values, subjective values integrate multiple determinants relevant to
the decision (commodity, quantity, probability, etc.), and this
integration takes place in prefrontal regions including the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)1–3. The activity of neurons in the primate
OFC is known to be independent of the spatial contingencies of
the task, including the action performed by the subject4,5. Furthermore, it is widely recognized that decisions between goods
take place in this non-spatial representation, whereas other types
of decisions are primarily or exclusively action-based6–8. However, it remains unclear exactly under what conditions a decision
should be conceptualized as “between goods”. In other words, it is
not clear what decisions take place in a spatial (action-based)
versus non-spatial (good-based) representation9. A particularly
interesting case is that of choices between goods that vary for
their action cost. In such conditions, the decision process
necessarily takes into account some aspect of the action. Thus,
two broad schemes have been put forth. One possibility is that the
brain ﬁrst computes the “stimulus value” (i.e., the subjective value
minus the action cost) in a non-spatial representation, and then
combines the stimulus value with the corresponding action cost
in a spatial representation. In this scheme, decisions under variable action costs would be action-based and take place in premotor regions6,10. Alternatively, action costs might be integrated
with other determinants of value in a non-spatial representation.
In this scheme, decisions under variable action costs could be
good-based3.
A closely related question pertains to the frames of reference in
which goods and values are represented. Neurons encoding the
subjective value were ﬁrst observed in the OFC of monkeys
choosing between different juices offered in variable amounts.
Different groups of cells encoded the value of individual options,
the identity of the chosen option and the chosen value4,11. In that
representation, options were deﬁned by the juice type. In other
words, neurons encoding the offer value were associated to a
speciﬁc juice, and their activity was linearly related to the quantity
offered on any given trial. We refer to this reference frame as
“commodity-based”. Notably, this reference frame was not
imposed by the choice task. An equally valid reference frame
would have been that in which cells encoding the offer value are
associated with a particular location. Subsequent studies suggested that neurons in OFC are ﬂexible, and that the reference
frame can adapt to the characteristics of the choice task. For
example, in the study of Tsujimoto et al., options were deﬁned
uniquely by their spatial location. Some neurons in the OFC
encoded the identity of the chosen option in a way that was
indistinguishable from a spatial representation12. Similar results
were also obtained by Abe and Lee13,14. More recent data suggest
that, under proper circumstances, the reference frame in OFC can
be based on a speciﬁc trait of the offer such as its informativeness15 (see Discussion). Taken together, these results suggest that
the reference frame in which good identities and values are
encoded in OFC may be malleable and adapt to the characteristics
of the choice task.
The experiments described here were conducted to assess
whether economic decisions under variable action costs can take
place in a non-spatial representation (goods space). While designing the choice task, we considered several issues.
First, it is generally difﬁcult to ascertain whether a decision is
made in goods space or actions space based on behavior alone.
However, this issue may be addressed using neural measures.
Speciﬁcally, to establish that a decision is good-based, it is
necessary to dissociate in time and space the presentation of the
offers and the indication of the actions associated with each offer.
Previous studies that used this approach focused on decisions
2

under ﬁxed action costs16,17. In these studies, subjects were presented two offers at the beginning of each trial; later in the trial,
subjects were shown two action targets associated with the two
offers. Neuronal activity encoding the choice outcome before
presentation of the action targets indicated that the decision was
made in goods space. Notably, the spatio-temporal dissociation
between the offers and the presentation of action targets was
crucial because it ensured that the neural activity encoding the
choice outcome did not reﬂect a computation taking place in
actions space. In the present experiments, we sought to undertake
a similar approach while manipulating the action costs.
Second, varying the action costs introduced a signiﬁcant
challenge because the offer presentation had to instruct the
subject (a rhesus monkey) about the action cost while preventing
the animal from planning the action itself. We considered using a
task in which actions would be reaching movements and action
costs would be manipulated by resisting or assisting loads18,19.
However, the biomechanics of the arm makes it difﬁcult to dissociate the action cost from the spatial components of the
movement. Speciﬁcally, two reaching movements of equal
amplitude towards different directions generally bear different
costs20. Thus, we designed a task in which animals chose between
two juices offered in variable amounts. Offers were associated
with radial eye movements in different directions, and different
saccade amplitudes imposed variable action costs. We reasoned
that if the initial ﬁxation point is straight ahead of the subject, the
action cost associated with an eye movement is essentially independent of the saccade direction (isotropic) and only depends on
the saccade amplitude.
Our experimental design made it possible to examine the
neuronal representation of goods and values in multiple frames of
reference (commodity-based, action-based, cost-based) and to
identify neuronal activity reﬂecting the action cost independently of an action plan. We report three primary results. First, as
a population, neurons in OFC represent the identities and values
of goods available for choice in two reference frames, namely
commodity-based and cost-based. Second, we ﬁnd neuronal
activity encoding the choice outcome before presentation of the
action targets, suggesting that decisions were made in goods
space. Third, a population of neurons encoding the offer value
reﬂects the integration of juice type, juice amount, and action
cost. These results generalize previous observations on goodbased decisions to choices under variable action costs, and
demonstrate a remarkable degree of adaptability in the neural
circuit underlying economic decisions.
Results
Experimental design and choice patterns. Figure 1a illustrates
the experimental design. Notably, each offer provided information about all the determinants of value (juice type, quantity, and
action cost), while preventing the animal from planning the
saccade necessary to obtain the offer. Behavioral evidence indicated that the experimental manipulation was effective. Figure 1b
illustrates the choice pattern recorded in one representative session. Trials were divided in two groups depending on whether
juice A was offered at low cost or at high cost. The gray sigmoid is
displaced to the right, indicating that the relative value of juice A
was higher when juice A was offered at low cost. This effect was
relatively modest, but it was consistent across sessions for both
monkeys. For a quantitative analysis of choice patterns, we constructed a logistic model that provided measures for the relative
value of the two juices (ρ), the difference in action cost (ξ), the
choice hysteresis related to the chosen juice (η) and to the chosen
cost (φ), and the spatial biases related to the offer position (δ) and
to the target position (ε) (see Methods, Eq. 1).
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Fig. 1 Experimental design and behavioral analysis. a At the beginning of the trial, the monkey ﬁxated a center point on the monitor. After 1.5 s, two offers
appeared to the left and right of the ﬁxation point. The offers were represented by sets of color symbols, with the color indicating the juice type, the number
of squares indicating juice amount and the shape of the symbols indicating the action cost associated with the offer (crosses, low cost; diamonds high
cost). The offers remained on the monitor for 1 s, then disappeared. The monkey continued ﬁxating the center point for another 1 s. At the end of this delay,
two saccade targets (two color dots) appeared. The two saccade targets were located on two (invisible) concentric rings centered on the ﬁxation point.
The monkey maintained ﬁxation for a randomly variable delay (0.6–1.2 s) before the center ﬁxation point was extinguished (go signal), at which point the
monkey indicated its choice with a saccade. Importantly, the association between the symbols (cross, diamond) and the saccade amplitudes (short, long)
was known to the monkey. b Choice patterns, one session. The percentage of B choices is plotted against the ratio #B:#A, where #A and #B are quantities
of juice A and B, respectively. Trials were separated in two groups depending on the action cost for juice A. The choice pattern obtained when juice A had a
high cost (black) was displaced to the left (lower indifference point) compared with the choice pattern obtained when juice A had a low cost (gray). The
regression lines were obtained with a simpliﬁed version of Eq. (1) in which terms a3 to a6 were removed. The action cost can be measured as ξ = a2/a0
(Eq. 1). c Distribution of action costs measured across sessions for monkey B (79 sessions, median(ξ) = 0.174, p < 10−10, Wilcoxon signed-rank test) and
for monkey L (107 sessions, median(ξ) = 0.327, p < 10−10, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Red triangles indicate median values

Pooling data from two animals, our data set included 223
behavioral sessions. In some sessions, the animal presented a
signiﬁcant bias in favor of saccade targets located in the left
hemiﬁeld. This effect was quantiﬁed by the normalized coefﬁcient
ε (Eq. 1), and the logistic analysis indicated that ε was
signiﬁcantly different from zero in 36 sessions (p < 0.01). We
interpret this target-related spatial bias as owing to rightwards
saccades imposing an additional action cost to the animal. The
ultimate reasons of this effect are not clear. However, since the
location of the saccade targets was initially unknown to the
animal, this spatial bias, when present, prevented us from
addressing the question of interest in this study, namely whether
decisions under known and variable action costs can take place in
a non-spatial representation. Thus we excluded from the analysis
sessions in which the spatial bias was statistically signiﬁcant.
Subsequent analyses focused on the remaining data set, which
included 186 sessions.
The difference in action cost was quantiﬁed by the normalized
coefﬁcient ξ (Eq. 1). We thus examined the distribution of ξ
across sessions. The difference in saccade amplitude had a
signiﬁcant effect on choices in both animals (monkey B, median
(ξ) = 0.174, p < 10−10; monkey L, median(ξ) = 0.327, p < 10−10;
Wilcoxon signed-rank test; Fig. 1c).
We previously observed that, other things equal, monkeys tend
to choose on any given trial the same juice chosen (and received)
in the previous trial11. This phenomenon, termed choice
hysteresis, was quantiﬁed by the normalized coefﬁcient η
(Eq. 1). Choice hysteresis was signiﬁcantly present in our data
set (median(η) = 0.228, p < 10−10; Wilcoxon signed-rank test). In
other words, the effect of choosing juice B in previous trials was
on average equivalent to adding 0.228 units to juice B in the

current trial. We also tested whether choices were affected by the
cost incurred in previous trial. This effect, quantiﬁed by the
normalized coefﬁcient φ (Eq. 1), was not signiﬁcant across
sessions (median(φ) = 2.5 × 10−4, p = 0.64; Wilcoxon signedrank test). Finally, the normalized coefﬁcient δ quantiﬁed offerbased spatial biases. Across sessions, this effect was statistically
signiﬁcant but rather small (median(δ) = 0.022, p < 0.01; Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
Encoding of goods and values in multiple reference frames. We
recorded from 786 neurons in the central OFC of two monkeys
(B, 367 cells; L, 419 cells). Firing rates were analyzed in nine time
windows aligned with different behavioral events (see Methods).
A “neuronal response” was deﬁned as the activity of one neuron
in one time window as a function of the trial type.
In principle, multiple frames of reference could be used to
represent good identities and values in the present task. In a
commodity-based reference frame, values would be attached to a
speciﬁc juice type (or, equivalently, to a speciﬁc color); in a
location-based reference frame, values would be attached to the
spatial location of the offer; in a cost-based reference frame,
values would be attached to the option with high or low cost (or,
equivalently, to a speciﬁc symbol). A qualitative inspection
indicated that neuronal responses typically did not depend on the
spatial locations of the offers. Conversely, a signiﬁcant fraction of
neurons encoded the value of individual offers (offer value), the
choice outcome and the chosen value. Surprisingly, some neurons
appeared to encode these variables in a commodity-based
reference frame, whereas other neurons appeared to encode
these variables in a cost-based reference frame. Figure 2 illustrates
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a few examples. The response in Fig. 2a varied as a linear function
of the value of juice B (variable offer value B). Similarly, the
response in Fig. 2b varied as a linear function of the value chosen
(variable chosen value). Finally, the response in Fig. 2c was
roughly binary—high when the animal chose juice A and low
when the animal chose juice B (variable chosen juice). For these
three cells, the modulation due to the action costs appeared
negligible. In contrast, the two responses depicted in Fig. 3 were
primarily affected by the action cost. Speciﬁcally, the response in
Fig. 3a varied as a linear function of the value associated with the
high-cost offer (variable offer value −). The response in Fig. 3b
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was roughly binary—high when the animal chose the low-cost
option and low when the animal chose the high-cost option
(variable chosen cost). Thus, neuronal representations in two
reference frames seemed to coexist during this choice task.
For a statistical analysis, we proceeded in steps. First, we
submitted each neuronal response to two three-way ANOVAs
(factors (trial type × offer A location × target A location); factors
(trial type × chosen offer location × chosen target location); see
Methods and Table 1). We imposed a signiﬁcance threshold p <
0.001. Responses that passed this criterion for at least one factor were
identiﬁed as “task-related” and included in subsequent analyses.
Conﬁrming previous observations4, many more neurons were
modulated by the trial type (276 cells = 35%) compared with offer
A location (35 cells = 4.5%), target A location (40 cells = 5.1%),
chosen offer location (36 cells = 4.6%), or chosen target location
(63 cells = 8.0%). Overall, 774 responses from 317 cells (40.3%) were
modulated by at least one factor, and only these responses were
included in subsequent analyses.
Next, we deﬁned a large number of variables potentially
encoded in OFC, and we used unbiased statistical procedures to
identify a small subset of variables that best explained the
neuronal data set. Previous work on decisions under ﬁxed action
costs already excluded numerous candidate variables in favor of
variables offer value, chosen value, and chosen juice4,21. Building
on these observations, here we focused on variables deﬁned by (or
disambiguated through) variable action costs. As noted above, the
experimental design afforded multiple reference frames. Thus, we
examined commodity-based variables offer value (juice) and
chosen juice, cost-based variables offer value (cost) and chosen
cost, location-based variables offer value (location) and chosen
location, and action-based variables offer value (target) and chosen
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Table 1 Task-related responses in different time windows

Pre-offer
Post-offer
Late-delay
Mem-delay
Pre-target
Post-target
Pre-go
Pre-juice
Post-juice
At least 1

Trial type
1
121
95
55
37
65
53
129
103
276

Offer A location
0
18
11
8
4
3
0
1
1
35

Target A location
1
0
0
0
1
22
20
6
1
40

Chosen offer location
0
23
12
7
1
1
0
1
0
36

Chosen target location
0
0
1
1
0
12
17
36
18
63

The table reports the results of two three-way ANOVAs (factors (trial type×offer A location×target A location); factors (trial type×chosen offer location×chosen target location). Each column represents
one factor, each row represents one time window, and numbers represent the number of cells signiﬁcantly modulated by the corresponding factor (p < 0.001). The bottom row indicates, for each factor,
the number of cells that passed the criterion in at least one of the nine time windows. The factor trial type is common to the two ANOVAs

Table 2 Deﬁned variables

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Collapsed variable
Offer value (juice)

Offer value (cost)

Offer value (location)

Offer value (target)

Variable
Offer value A
Offer value B
Chosen juice
Offer value −
Offer value +
Chosen cost
Offer value L
Offer value R
Chosen location
Offer value target L
Offer value target R
Chosen target
Cost of A
Offer A location
Target A location
Offer + location
Target + location
Spatial congruence
Chosen value

Deﬁnition
ρ #A + ξ δjuice A,+
#B + ξ δjuice B,+
1 if juice B is chosen, 0 if juice A is chosen
Offer value A if A is high-cost, offer value B if B is high-cost
Offer value A if A is low-cost, offer value B if B is low-cost
1 if low-cost offer is chosen, 0 if high-cost offer is chosen
Value of the juice offered on the left
Value of the juice offered on the right
1 if left offer is chosen, 0 if right offer is chosen
Value of the juice associated with target in the left hemiﬁeld
Value of the juice associated with target in the right hemiﬁeld
1 if saccade to left hemiﬁeld, 0 if saccade to right hemiﬁeld
1 if offer A is low-cost, 0 if offer A is high-cost
1 if juice A is offered on left, 0 if juice A is offered on right
1 if target A is in left hemiﬁeld, 0 if target A is in right hemiﬁeld
1 if low-cost offer is on the left, 0 if low-cost offer is on the right
1 if low-cost target is in the left hemiﬁeld, 0 otherwise
1 if offers and targets are spatially congruent, 0 otherwise
Offer value A if juice A chosen, offer value B if juice B chosen

Reference frame
Commodity
Commodity
Commodity
Cost
Cost
Cost
Visual
Visual
Visual
Action
Action
Action

In any given trial, #A and #B were, respectively, the quantities of juice A and juice B offered to the animal, ρ was the relative value of the two juices, and ξ was the action cost. Parameters ρ and ξ were
obtained from the logistic regression (Eq. 1). The variable spatial congruence was set = 1 ( = 0) if the offer and the saccade target associated with a given juice were presented in the same (opposite)
hemiﬁeld

target. In addition, we deﬁned variables that captured the
association between different reference frames including the
association between juice type and cost (cost of A), juice type and
offer location (offer A location), juice type and target location
(target A location), cost and offer location (offer + location), cost
and target location (target + location), and offer location and
target location (spatial congruence). Finally, we tested the variable
chosen value. All the variables included in the analysis are deﬁned
in Table 2.
Each response that passed the analysis of variance criterion was
regressed on each variable. A variable was said to “explain” the
response if the regression slope differed signiﬁcantly from zero (p <
0.05). Each linear regression also provided the R2. For variables that
did not explain the response, we set R2 = 0. The variable with the
largest R2 provided the “best ﬁt” for the neuronal response. Figure 4
illustrates the results obtained for the population. Figure 4a
indicates the number of responses explained by each variable in
each time window. Notably, each response could be explained by
more than one variable and thus could contribute to multiple bins
in this panel. Figure 4b illustrates a complementary account. Here,
each response was assigned to the variable that provided the best ﬁt.
In early time windows, the dominant variables were offer value

(juice), offer value (cost), and chosen value. In late time windows,
after target presentation and upon juice delivery, the dominant
variables were chosen value, chosen juice, and chosen cost. Two
procedures—stepwise and best-subset—were used to identify the
variables that best explained the neuronal data set (see Methods).
As in previous work16, variables were selected separately for preand post-target time windows. For early time windows, both
procedures selected variables offer value (juice), offer value (cost),
and chosen value. For late time windows, both procedures selected
variables chosen value, chosen juice, and chosen cost. Figure 5
illustrates the percentage of neurons encoding each of the selected
variables across different time windows.
To summarize, neurons in OFC encoded the values of
individual offers, the chosen value and the binary choice
outcome. Remarkably, some neurons encoded the offer value
(juice), whereas other neurons encoded the offer value (cost).
Similarly, some neurons encoded the chosen juice, whereas other
neurons encoded the chosen cost. Thus the offer value and
the binary choice outcome were simultaneously represented in
two reference frames (commodity-based and cost-based). This
result demonstrates a high degree of ﬂexibility in the decision
circuit.
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Fig. 4 Population summary of linear regressions (all time windows). a Explained responses. Row and columns represent time windows and variables,
respectively. In each location, the number indicates the number of responses explained by the corresponding variable in that time window. For example, in
the post-offer time window, the variable offer value (juice) explained 100 responses. The same numbers are also represented in gray scale. Note that each
response could be explained by more than one variable and thus could contribute to multiple bins in this panel. b Best ﬁt. In each location, the number
indicates the number of responses for which the corresponding variable provided the best ﬁt (highest R2). For example, in the post-offer time window, the
variable offer value (juice) provided the best ﬁt for 42 responses. The numerical values are also represented in gray scale. In this plot, each response
contributes to at most one bin. Qualitatively, offer value (juice), and chosen value seem to be the dominant variables in early time windows. Conversely,
chosen juice and chosen cost seem to be the dominant variables in late time windows. The variable chosen value is present througout the trial

Good-based economic decisions under variable action costs.
We next examined whether decisions in our task were made
before target presentation and thus in goods space. As described
above, two groups of neurons—namely chosen juice and chosen
cost—reﬂected the binary choice outcome. Both variables were
most prominent late in the trial, before, and after juice delivery.
However, both variables also provided the best ﬁt for a sizeable
number of cells in early time windows, shortly after the offer
(Fig. 4). Thus, the critical question was whether the decision of
the animal could be reliably predicted from the neuronal activity
recorded before target presentation. We examined these two
signals in turn.
First, we identiﬁed chosen juice cells (largest sum(R2) across all
time windows; 108 cells)11. We thus examined the activity of
these neurons in early time windows. For each cell, we refer to the
juice eliciting higher ﬁring rates as the “encoded” juice (juice E),
and to the juice eliciting lower ﬁring rates as the “other” juice
(juice O). We divided trials depending on the chosen juice and we
6

examined the activity proﬁle for the population (Fig. 6a). The two
traces were clearly separated starting ~ 250 ms after the offer and
throughout the delay, indicating that decisions were completed
long before action planning.
Choices in our experiments reliably depended on the saccade
amplitude, but the behavioral effect was relatively small (Fig. 1c).
Thus, it is conceivable that upon easy decisions, when one value
clearly dominated, monkeys effectively ignored the difference in
action cost. One concern was whether the effect illustrated in
Fig. 6a was driven by trials in which animals ignored the action
cost. To address this issue, we deﬁned “cost-overt” offer types as
those in which the animal chose the low-cost offer more
frequently ( > 10%) than the high-cost offer, conditioned on the
animal choosing each option at least twice (e.g., Fig. 1b, 1B:1 A).
Conversely, “cost-covert” offer types were those in which the
animal consistently chose the same option independently of the
action cost (e.g., Fig. 1b, 1B:4A). We divided trials in four groups
depending on the chosen juice (E or O) and on whether the effect
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(see Methods and Table 1). The y axis in this ﬁgure represents the
percentage of these neurons encoding the corresponding variable in each
time window

of action costs was overt (o) or covert (c). For each group, we
averaged the activity proﬁles across trials and across cells. Visual
inspection of Fig. 6b indicates that the two traces for covert action
costs—Ec and Oc trials—were clearly separated. Crucially, the
two traces for overt action costs—Eo and Oo trials—were also
separated. We quantiﬁed this separation using a receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) analysis, which returned the area
under the curve (AUC; see Methods). For each cell, AUC > 0.5
( < 0.5) indicated higher (lower) ﬁring rates when the animal
chose the juice encoded by the cell (Eo trials). For example, for
the cell in Fig. 2c, AUC = 0.79. In other words, the activity of this
neuron recorded prior to target presentation reliably revealed the
eventual choice outcome. Across the population of chosen juice
cells, the distribution of AUC was signiﬁcantly displaced
compared with chance level in each of three non-overlapping
time windows (Fig. 6c), conﬁrming that cost-affected decisions
were made prior to target presentation.
We conducted a similar analysis on the population of neurons
encoding the chosen cost (62 cells). Again, we identiﬁed these
neurons based on their activity across all time windows and we
analyzed the activity preceding target presentation. We ﬁrst
considered all the trials, and divided them depending on whether
the animal chose the high-cost or the low-cost offer. In this
analysis, the two traces separated starting ~ 250 ms after the offer
(not shown). We then focused on cost-overt offer types and we
conducted an ROC analysis. Across the population, the distribution of AUC was signiﬁcantly above chance level in two of three
non-overlapping time windows (Fig. 6d).
In summary, both chosen juice and chosen cost neurons
revealed the binary choice outcome well before target presentation, indicating that decisions were made in goods space.
Integration of action costs and other determinants of value.
Thus far, we have shown (1) that decisions were informed by the
action cost, (2) that decisions were good-based, and (3) that three
groups of neurons encoded variables offer value (juice), offer value

ARTICLE

(cost), and chosen value cells. Next we examined whether these
value-encoding cells integrated all three determinants affecting
choices (i.e., juice type, quantity, and action cost).
First, we examined neurons encoding the offer value (juice).
These cells were associated to a juice type and their ﬁring rates
varied as a function of the juice quantity. The question is whether
ﬁring rates also varied as a function of the action cost. In
principle, this issue could be addressed by deﬁning two variants of
each offer value (juice) variable—one cost-affected and one costindependent. Both variants could be included in the variable
selection analysis and the variant with the higher explanatory
power would be selected. However, because the difference in
action cost was relatively modest in our task, the two variants
were quantitatively close and the variable selection analysis did
not disambiguate between them. We thus proceeded as follows.
The variable selection analysis described in the previous section
was performed using cost-affected variables (Table 2). However,
we repeated the analysis using cost-independent variables and we
obtained identical results (same selected variables). For each
response, we computed the difference between the R2 (ΔR2)
obtained with the two variables (cost-affected and cost-independent; see Methods). Across the population, the distribution of
ΔR2 was tendentially displaced toward negative values (mean
(ΔR2) = −0.0065, p = 0.055; Fig. 7a). In other words, neurons
encoding the offer value (juice) did not seem to integrate action
costs with the other determinants of value. To further quantify
the effects of action cost, we regressed each offer value (juice)
response against the offer value using an analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA, parallel model) and grouping data by the action cost.
Although the factor action cost was statistically signiﬁcant for
25% of responses, there was no consistent correlation between the
slope of the encoding and the sign of this effect (Supplementary
Fig. 1a). Thus, we did not ﬁnd a systematic effect of the action
cost for this population.
We conducted a similar analysis on neurons encoding the offer
value (cost). In this case, each response was associated to a cost
level and ﬁring rates varied as a function of the juice quantity.
Thus, we examined whether ﬁring rates also varied as a function
of the juice type. Again, we deﬁned two variants of the variable—
one commodity-affected and one commodity-independent—and
we conﬁrmed that the variable selection analysis yielded the same
results for both variants. For each response, we computed the
difference between the two R2 obtained with the two variables
(ΔR2). Across the population, ΔR2 was signiﬁcantly > 0 (mean
(ΔR2) = 0.017, p < 0.05; Fig. 7b). Hence, these neurons encoded a
value variable integrating juice type and quantity in a cost-based
representation. An ANCOVA conﬁrmed this ﬁnding (see
Methods; Supplementary Fig. 1b).
Finally, we examined chosen value cells. Their activity
depended on both the juice type and the juice quantity; we
assessed whether it also reﬂected the action cost. We deﬁned two
variants of the variable and we conﬁrmed that the variable
selection analysis yielded the same results. For each response, we
computed the difference in R2. Interestingly, we found a
dissociation between early and late time windows. In the postoffer time window, the distribution of ΔR2 was signiﬁcantly < 0
(mean(ΔR2) = −0.013, p < 0.01; Fig. 7c). Conversely, in the posttarget time window, the distribution of ΔR2 was tendentially > 0
(mean(ΔR2) = 0.0089, p = 0.058; Fig. 7c). The difference across
time windows was statistically signiﬁcant (mean Δ(ΔR2) = 0.022,
p < 0.001; Fig. 7c). Thus, chosen value responses progressed from
integrating only juice type and quantity to integrating all three
determinants. An ANCOVA conﬁrmed these observations
(Supplementary Fig. 1c, d). Of note, chosen value responses in
different time windows often came from different cells (chisquare test, p = 0.14).
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traces ( ≥ 2 trials per trace). Notably, the activity proﬁle in Eo trials is elevated compared with that in Oo trials. c ROC analysis for 97 chosen juice cells in
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Discussion
In the experiments described here, options varied along three
dimensions—juice type, quantity, and action cost. Importantly, the
task design dissociated in time and space offer presentation from
action planning. We reported three primary results. First, the
neuronal population represented good identities and values in two
reference frames, namely commodity-based and cost-based. Second,
8

a group of cells encoded values as an integrated quantity reﬂecting
all the dimensions relevant to the decision. Third, neuronal activity
encoding the choice outcome before presentation of the saccade
target indicated that decisions (i.e., value comparisons) were made
in goods space. We discuss these ﬁndings in reverse order.
Current views hold that decisions between goods take place in a
non-spatial representation6–9. Conversely, decisions underlying
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action selection involve motor systems. Inspired by this observation, several authors argued that some value-based decisions take
place in an action-based representation6–8. According to a unifying
proposal, decisions generally emerge from multiple competitions
taking place in parallel within and across brain regions and neuronal representations. In this view, good-based decisions and
action-based decisions are particular cases of distributed-consensus
mechanisms6,22–24. Critically, the distributed-consensus framework does not specify under what conditions a decision can be
conceptualized as a decision between goods. In this respect, a
particularly interesting case is that of choices between options that
differ for their action cost. According to one proposal, these
decisions are necessarily action-based6,10. Alternatively, action
costs could be integrated with other determinants of value in a
non-spatial representation. If so, decisions under variable action
costs may in fact be good-based3.
To establish whether a decision is good-based, one must dissociate offer presentation from action planning. If this condition
is met, neural signals encoding the choice outcome prior to action
planning reveal that the decision took place in goods space.
Previous work used this approach to show that decisions between
edible goods under ﬁxed action cost are indeed good-based16,17.
The present study extends earlier results to choices under variable
action costs. In other words, our results indicate that decisions
can be good-based even when the value of each good depends on

the effort necessary to obtain that good. Importantly, our ﬁndings
are not inconsistent with the idea that motor regions play a
primary role in the calculation of action costs. For example,
previous work suggested a speciﬁc role of the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) in choice under variable action cost25–27. Signals
from ACC and/or other motor regions could provide an input for
the computation of subjective values in OFC. Furthermore, our
results do not exclude that in different conditions—e.g., when
offer presentation and action planning are not dissociated—
motor systems may participate in value comparison6,9,28.
Previous studies argued that motor regions can represent
multiple action plans at once29,30. Thus, one concern might be
whether our animals made a decision early in the trial in actions
space. Several considerations diffuse this concern. First, evidence
for the simultaneous representation of multiple action plans is not
conclusive. Indeed, responses that seem bimodal when averaged
across trials might really be unimodal on any given trial31. One
study that recorded from many cells simultaneously and conducted single-trial analyses concluded that neurons in premotor
cortex process only one action plan at the time31. Furthermore,
“bimodal” neurons were found in rostral F2 and in F729,32,33.
However, F7 is a prefrontal (not a motor) area34,35 and neurons
in rostral F2 are often associated with eye movements rather than
arm movements36,37. Looking forward, it will be interesting to
record from motor regions using our task, and to compare the
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time course of neural activity across areas. For now, it seems safe
to assume that action-based decisions in our task would necessarily take place after target presentation.
Economic choices depend on a variety of determinants
(dimensions) along which goods may vary, and numerous studies
found that neurons in the OFC integrate multiple determinants of
value4,21,38. Most relevant here, Kennerley et al.39 found neurons
whose activity was modulated by the juice quantity, the probability and the action cost. The fraction of neurons presenting all
three modulations at once was relatively small, but Kennerley’s
analysis was conservative and likely underestimated the degree of
integration (owing to type II errors). In another study, Morrison
and Salzman40 showed that the same OFC neurons responded
both to positive reinforcers (drops of juice) and negative reinforcers (air puffs). More recently, Hirokawa et al.41 found in the
rodent OFC neurons integrating reward quantity and decision
conﬁdence in a value signal. Last but not least, numerous studies
found evidence for integration in the BOLD signal using a variety
of behavioral manipulations42,43. Hence, the observation that
offer value cells integrate juice type, juice quantity, and action
costs is in line with established concepts. As for chosen value cells,
we found evidence for full integration in late but not in early time
windows. In general, the role played by these neurons in the
decision process remains unclear. Future work should further
examine this important issue in the light of current observations.
In spite of the robust evidence for dimensional integration in
OFC, two previous reports reached different conclusions. In one
study, the choice task varied juice quantity and action cost, or
juice quantity, and time delay44. The authors found only few OFC
neurons that integrated determinants in a value signal. However,
their statistical procedures effectively fractionated the population
of value-encoding cells, which likely impeded the identiﬁcation of
these neurons21. More recently, Blanchard et al. used a choice
task varying juice quantity and the time at which information
about the trial outcome was made available. Although both
dimensions affected choice, the authors failed to ﬁnd evidence for
dimensional integration in OFC15. As discussed below, this result
might reﬂect the failure to consider alternative reference frames.
Choice tasks often afford multiple reference frames. For
example, in experiments that involve multiple commodities45,46,
goods and values may be represented in a commodity-based
frame. Conversely, in tasks that involve a single commodity44,47,
goods and values are necessarily represented in some other
reference frame. In choice tasks where options differ by a particular determinant—probability21, delay48, cost, etc.—a valid
reference frame may be that deﬁned by that determinant. In
general, any characteristics of the choice task can provide a valid
reference frame. For example, tasks in which options are presented sequentially15,49,50 afford an order-based reference frame;
tasks in which options are deﬁned by the outcome of the previous
trial12,51 afford the corresponding reference frame; etc. In our
experiment, valid frames included that deﬁned by the commodity,
the action cost, the spatial location of the offer and the saccade
targets. Interestingly, different groups of cells represented goods
and values in different frames. This result indicates that the
representation of goods and values is highly malleable, and suggests that this neural circuit can reconﬁgure itself depending on
the demands of the choice task. Of course, such malleability is a
hallmark of prefrontal regions52.
The fact that goods and values may be represented in multiple
reference frames has far-reaching implications. To dissect the
neural circuit of economic decisions, and speciﬁcally to establish
what variables are encoded or not-encoded in a particular brain
region during a choice task, it is generally necessary to examine
multiple reference frames and to identify the reference frame that
best accounts for the neuronal data. Conversely, failure to
10

consider a valid reference frame may explain some otherwise
puzzling results. For example, in the study by Blanchard et al.,
monkeys chose between two options. Each option was a gamble
with ﬁxed probability, and the two options varied for the juice
quantity and the informativeness15. Valid reference frames
included that deﬁned by the temporal order (order-based) and
that deﬁned by the informativeness (information-based). Neuronal recordings were performed in OFC. Focusing on the time
window following the ﬁrst offer, the authors regressed ﬁring rates
against the juice quantity and, separately, against the informativeness of the ﬁrst offer. For each regressor, a sizeable fraction of
cells had a signiﬁcant effect, indicating that both determinants of
value were represented in OFC. However, there was no correlation between the regression coefﬁcients obtained for the two
variables. The authors concluded that the neuronal population
did not encode an integrated value. Of note, this claim was based
on a negative result. Thus any source of noise—poor isolation,
low cell count, etc.—effectively worked in favor of the conclusion.
Most relevant here, the analysis assumed an order-based representation. In such reference frame, cells encoding the offer value
of the ﬁrst option would integrate the quantity and the informativeness of that option, and the two regression coefﬁcients
should indeed be correlated. However, this prediction does not
hold in a different reference frame. In particular, if the representation was information-based, one group of cells would be
associated with the informative option and another group of cells
would be associated with the non-informative option. The
regression coefﬁcients obtained for quantity and informativeness
might still be related in any given cell. However, once different
groups of cells (including cells with positive and negative
encoding) had been pooled together, there would be no systematic relation between regression coefﬁcients. Importantly,
other results of the Blanchard study seem inconsistent with an
order-based representation (their Fig. 4a, b) and suggest an
information-based representation (their Fig. 5a, b). Additional
analyses53 did not address this issue.
To conclude, assessing what reference frame(s) the brain
adopts in any given condition is critical to understand the neuronal computations underlying the decision process. Together
with other studies, our current ﬁndings indicate that the neural
circuit underlying good-based decisions can reconﬁgure itself
depending on the demands of the choice task. This reconﬁguration may be conceptualized as a discrete form of context adaptation9. Importantly, the rules governing such adaptation and
dictating the reference frame adopted on a given context are
unclear and should be examined in future research.
Methods
Experimental procedures. All experimental procedures conformed to the NIH
Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and were approved by the
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) at Washington University.
Two rhesus monkeys (B, male, 9.0 kg; L, female, 6.5 kg) took part in the experiments. Before training, a head-restraining device and an oval recording chamber
were implanted on the skull under general anesthesia, as previously described16.
The behavioral task was controlled through a custom-written software based on
Matlab (MathWorks) and freely available at http://www.monkeylogic.net/. In each
session, an animal chose between two juices offered in different amounts and at
variable action cost. Figure 1 illustrates the task design. At the beginning of each
trial, the monkey ﬁxated a point in the center of the monitor, within a tolerance
window of 2° (in a subset of sessions the tolerance window was 3°). After 1.5 s, two
offers appeared to the left and right of the ﬁxation point. The offers were represented by sets of color symbols, with the color indicating the juice type, the number
of symbols indicating juice amount, and the shape of the symbols indicating the
action cost (cross for low cost; diamond for high cost). Different sets of juices were
used across sessions. The offers remained on the monitor for 1 s. The monkey
continued ﬁxating for another 1 s, after which two saccade targets appeared. The
two saccade targets, represented by two color dots corresponding to the color of the
two juices, were located on two concentric rings centered on the ﬁxation point. The
radius for low-cost targets was 3.5°–4°; the radius for high-cost targets was 10°–16°.
In each trial, one of the saccade targets was placed on the low-cost (small radius)

NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | (2019)10:393 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-08209-3 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications

NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-08209-3

ring, whereas the other saccade target was placed on high-cost (large radius) ring.
The two targets were always placed on opposite sides of the center ﬁxation. The
angle deﬁning their position was selected on every trial among four possible values,
corresponding to 22.5°, 157.5°, 202.5°, and 337.5° from azimuth. Thus, for each
juice there were eight possible saccade target positions (two distances × four
angles). The monkey maintained center ﬁxation for a randomly variable delay
(0.6–1.2 s), at the end of which the ﬁxation point was extinguished (go signal). At
that point the animal was allowed to indicate its choice with a saccade. The animal
had to maintain peripheral ﬁxation for an additional 0.75 s, at the end of which the
chosen juice was delivered. In each session, the two juice quantities varied pseudorandomly from trial to trial. The spatial positions of the offers, the action costs and
the angle of the saccade targets varied pseudo-randomly and were counterbalanced across trials.
Neuronal recordings. Procedures for surgery, neuronal recordings, and spike
sorting were similar to those described previously16. In brief, the recording
chamber (main axes, 50 × 30 mm) was centered on stereotaxic coordinates (A30,
L0), with the longer axis parallel to the coronal plane. During the experiments,
animals sat in an electrically insulated enclosure (Crist Instruments) with their
head restrained. The eye position was monitored with an infrared video camera
(Eyelink; SR Research). Neuronal recordings were guided by structural MRI
obtained for each animal before and after the implant, and focused on a region
roughly corresponding to area 13 m54. In monkey B, we recorded from both
hemispheres and recording locations ranged A36–A39 in the anterior–posterior
direction (with the corpus callosum extending anteriorly to A36). In monkey L, we
recorded from the left hemisphere and recording locations ranged A31–A36 in the
anterior–posterior direction (with the corpus callosum extending anteriorly to
A31). Tungsten electrodes (125 µm diameter, FHC) were advanced using custombuilt motorized micro-drives, with a 2.5 µm resolution. We typically used four
electrodes in each session. Electrical signals were ampliﬁed and band-passed ﬁltered (high pass: 300 Hz, low pass: 6 kHz; Lynx 8, Neuralynx, Inc.). Action
potentials were detected on-line and waveforms were saved to disk (25 kHz sampling rate; Power 1401, Spike 2; Cambridge Electronic Design). Spike sorting was
conducted off-line (Spike 2; Cambridge Electronic Design) and only cells that
appeared well isolated and stable throughout the session were included in the
analysis.
Analysis of choice patterns. All analyses were conducted in Matlab (MathWorks). On any given trial, one “offer” was deﬁned by a juice type, its quantity and
its action cost (e.g., 3B−). An “offer type” was deﬁned by two offers (e.g., [1 A
+ :3B−]). In this notation, “−“ indicates high action cost (long saccade) and “ + “
indicates low action cost (short saccade). A “trial type” was deﬁned by two offers
and a choice (e.g., [1 A + :3B−, A]). Of note, the position of each saccade target
was deﬁned by a distance (two possible values) and an angle (four possible values).
For the purpose of all the analyses, we turned the angle into a binary variable
corresponding to whether the target associated to juice A or the chosen target was
placed in the left hemisphere or in the right hemisphere.
In the behavioral analysis, we examined several factors that could affect choices,
including the juice quantity, the action cost, the outcome of the previous trial
(choice hysteresis), a term capturing a visual side bias, and a term capturing a
saccade side bias. We thus constructed the following logistic model:
choice B ¼ 1=ð1 þ eX Þ



X ¼ a0 #B  a1 #A þ a2 δjuice B;þ  δjuice A;þ


þa3 δ n1; B  δ n1; A þ


þa4 δ cost of B;cost n1  δ cost of A;cost n1




þa5 δ offer B;left  δoffer A;left þ a6 δtarget B; left  δtarget A; left

ð1Þ

where choice B = 1 if the animal chose juice B and 0 otherwise; #J was the quantity
of juice J offered (with J = A, B); δjuice J, + = 1 if juice J was offered at low cost and 0
otherwise; δn−1, J = 1 if in the previous trial the animal had chosen and received
juice J and 0 otherwise; δcost of J, cost n−1 = 1 if the cost of J is the same as that
chosen in the previous trial and 0 otherwise; δoffer J, left = 1 if the offer of juice J was
placed to the left of the center ﬁxation and 0 otherwise; and δtarget J, left = 1 if the
saccade target associated with juice J was placed in the left hemisphere and 0
otherwise. For each session, the logistic regression provided a measure for the
relative value of the two juices (ρ = a1/a0), for the difference in action cost (ξ = a2/
a0), for the choice hysteresis related to the chosen juice (η = a3/a0) and to the
chosen cost (φ = a4/a0), and for the spatial biases related to the offer position (δ =
a5/a0) and to the target position (ε = a6/a0). In this formulation, each factor (action
cost, hysteresis, spatial biases) is quantiﬁed as a value term, and all values are
expressed in units of juice B. The relative value (ρ) is essentially the quantity of
juice B that, when offered against 1 A, makes the animal indifferent between the
two juices. The factor a1 can be thought of as an inverse temperature capturing the
steepness of the sigmoid once all the effects included in the logistic regression are
accounted for.

ARTICLE

Task-related responses. The neuronal analysis focused on sessions with no signiﬁcant spatial bias (see Results). Each cell was analyzed in relation to the choice
pattern recorded in the same session. In each trial, the neuronal activity was
analyzed in nine time windows aligned with different behavioral events: pre-offer
(0.5 s before the offer), post-offer (0.5 s after offer on), late-delay (0.5–1.0 s after
offer on), mem-delay (0–0.5 s after offer off), pre-target (0.5 s before target on),
post-target (0.5 s after target on), pre-go (0.5 s before the ‘go’), pre-juice (0.5 s
before the juice), and post-juice (0.5 s after the juice).
To identify task-related responses, each neuronal response was submitted to
two three-way ANOVAs (factors [trial type × offer A location × target A location];
factors [trial type × chosen offer location × chosen target location]). We imposed a
signiﬁcance threshold p < 0.001. Responses that passed this criterion for at least one
factor were identiﬁed as “task-related” and included in subsequent analyses.
Variable selection analysis. We conducted a series of analyses to identify the
variables encoded by the neuronal population adopting the same general approach
used in previous work4,55. We deﬁned a large number of variables that neurons in
the OFC might conceivably encode, and we applied procedures for variable
selection to identify a small subset of variables that best explained the neuronal data
set. Previous studies on decisions under ﬁxed action costs already examined a large
number of variables4. The results indicated that neurons in OFC encoded variables
offer value, chosen value, and chosen juice. In contrast, the marginal explanatory
power of other tested variables—including total value, other value, value difference,
etc.—was very low. These results were replicated several times16,56. Thus, in the
present study we focused on variables that were not already excluded in previous
work, and in particular on variables deﬁned by (or disambiguated through) variable
action costs.
We were particularly interested in contrasting variables deﬁned in different
reference frames, and speciﬁcally variables deﬁned by the juice type (commodity),
the action cost, the spatial conﬁguration of the offers and the spatial component of
the action. For all reference frames, we expressed values in units of juice B (see above
and Eq. 1). For the commodity-based frame, we deﬁned offer value variables offer
value A = ρ #A + ξ δjuice A,+ and offer value B = #B + ξ δjuice B,+, where δjuice J,+ = 1
if juice J is low-cost and 0 otherwise, and J = A, B. Notably, each of these variables
was associated with a speciﬁc juice type, and both variables reﬂected value as an
integrated quantity: offer value A reﬂected the juice quantity (#A), the relative value
of the two juices (ρ), and the action cost (ξ); offer value B reﬂected the juice quantity
(#B) and the action cost (ξ). As in previous studies, we also deﬁned the “collapsed”
variable offer value (juice), to which we assigned the higher of the two R2 obtained
for offer value A and offer value B. Similarly, for each of the other reference frames,
we deﬁned two offer value variables that reﬂected value as an integrated quantity. For
example, the variable offer value + was associated to the low-cost offer and reﬂected
the juice type, the juice quantity, and the relative value of the two juices (see Table 2).
For each reference frame, we deﬁned a collapsed offer value variable and a variable
capturing the binary choice outcome. In addition, we deﬁned variables that captured
the association between different reference frames (see Results) and the variable
chosen value. All the variables included in the analysis are deﬁned in Table 2.
For details on the procedures used in the variable selection analysis, we refer to
previous reports4,16. In brief, we examined collapsed offer value variables. As the
task transitioned from choice to action at the time of target presentation, we
performed the variable selection analyses separately for pre- and post-target time
windows. Two procedures—stepwise and best-subset—identiﬁed a small number of
variables that best explained the neuronal data set. In the stepwise procedure, we
selected at each step the variable that provided the highest number of best ﬁts
within any time window. We then removed from the data set all the responses
explained by this variable and we repeated the procedure on the residual data. The
procedure was repeated until when the marginal explanatory power of any
additional variable fell < 5%. In the best-subset procedure, we identiﬁed for n = 1,
2, 3,… the subset of n variables that collectively provided the highest explanatory
power. Importantly, the best-subset procedure warrants optimality and the two
procedures applied to our data set provided identical results.

Activity proﬁles and ROC analysis. Several analyses were conducted dividing
trials in four groups, depending on the choice of the animal and on whether the
offer type was cost-overt or cost-covert. For neurons encoding the chosen juice,
trials were divided depending on whether the animal chose the juice encoded by
the cell (juice E, deﬁned as that which elicited higher activity) or the other juice
(juice O). For neurons encoding the chosen cost, trials were divided depending on
whether the animal chose the high-cost or the low-cost offer. In all cases, “costovert” offer types were those in which the animal chose the low-cost offer more
frequently ( > 10%) than the high-cost offer, conditioned on the animal choosing
each option at least twice; “cost-covert” offer types were those in which the animal
consistently chose the same option independently of the action cost. To calculate
the activity proﬁle (i.e., the spike density function), trials were separately aligned at
offer presentation, at target presentation and at juice delivery. For each alignment
and each trial, spike times, expressed in 1 ms resolution, were convolved with a
Gaussian kernel of 40 ms width. To normalize activity proﬁles, we ﬁrst subtracted
the mean activity in the pre-offer time window and then divided by the mean
activity averaged across the other eight time windows.
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All ROC analyses were performed on raw spike counts, without time averaging
or baseline correction. To identify choice-related signals (Fig. 6c, d), we deﬁned
three time windows following offer presentation: post-offer 1 (0–250 ms), postoffer 2 (250 500 ms), and post-offer 3 (500 750 ms). For Fig. 6c, we ﬁrst identiﬁed
“cost-overt” offer types then we divided trials in two groups depending on the
chosen juice (preferred or non-preferred). The two groups were compared with an
ROC, from which we measured the AUC. This AUC is the probability with which
an ideal observer would correctly infer the choice of the animal from the activity of
one chosen juice cell and is thus equivalent to the measure of choice probability
deﬁned for perceptual decisions57,58. To obtain a single AUC for each neuron, we
averaged the AUC across offer types59. For Fig. 6d, we divided trials in two groups
depending on the chosen cost (high or low). We computed the AUC for each costovert offer type and we averaged across offer types.
Dimensional integration in value signals. We examined the integration of
multiple determinants into a single value signals for offer value (juice) responses.
To do so, we deﬁned two variants of the variable offer value (juice)—one costaffected and one cost-independent. We sought to assess which variant better ﬁt
neuronal responses. For each response, we considered the two R2 and we computed
the difference ΔR2 = R2cost-affected−R2cost-independent and we examined the distribution for ΔR2 across the population. We did not want to bias the results in favor of
either variant. Thus, for this analysis we identiﬁed neuronal responses encoding the
offer value (juice) as follows. For each response and each value variable, we considered the two R2 obtained from the two variants, and we assigned the maximum
R2 to the response. We then assigned each response to one of the selected variables
accordingly. To further quantify the effects of action cost on this population, each
response was ﬁtted against the offer value using an ANCOVA (parallel model) and
grouping data by the action cost. As any neuron could be tuned in multiple time
windows, we conservatively focused only on the post-offer time window, when
offer value (juice) responses were most prevalent.
We conducted similar analyses on responses encoding the offer value (cost).
Speciﬁcally, we examined whether ﬁring rates varied as a function of the juice type.
We deﬁned two variants of the variable offer value (cost)—one commodity-affected
and one commodity-independent. The variable selection analysis provided the
same results for both variants. We identiﬁed neuronal responses encoding the offer
value (cost) in an unbiased way based on the maximum of the two R2. Focusing on
the time window immediately following the offer, we computed the difference
ΔR2 = R2commodity-affected−R2commodity-independent and we examined the distribution
for ΔR2 across the population. To further quantify the effects of juice type on this
population, each response was regressed against the variable offer value (cost) using
an ANCOVA (parallel model) and grouping data by the juice type. We
conservatively focused only on the post-offer time window, when offer value (cost)
responses were most prevalent.
Finally, we examined responses encoding the chosen value. We deﬁned two
variants of chosen value—one cost-affected and one cost-independent—and we
veriﬁed that the variable selection analysis provided the same results. We then
identiﬁed chosen value responses in an unbiased way based on the maximum R2.
For each response, computed the difference in R2, and we examined the
distribution for ΔR2 across the population in the post-offer time window. Chosen
value responses were further analyzed with an ANCOVA (parallel model). For each
response, data were grouped by the action cost and ﬁring rates were regressed a
against the variable chosen value.
Code availability. The code used for data analysis is available upon reasonable
request.
Reporting summary. Further information on experimental design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
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